My law firm and I have represented many physicians over many years, in a variety of contexts. Recently, peer review and relations with hospitals has come to the fore. We have also represented California Pacific Medical Associates in its relations with the Office of the Attorney General in connection with its transformation into a nonprofit mutual benefit association, and with competitors, as well as the Federal Trade Commission (by way of both compliance and response to legal process). For individual physicians we have counseled on and litigated a variety of issues including malpractice defense, Medical Board issues, discrimination, constitutional rights, and business relations.
I have also drafted proposed amendments to statutes relating to physicians, California Medical Association (CMA) resolutions, and posted substantive and critical comments on current issues. Some of these efforts appear on the current issues page of this website. I have also explored the role of arbitration in peer review, and a work-in-progress about that is a page of this website: "The Case of the Missing Arbitrators -- fixing peer review." An abbreviated text of the article that Dr. Mileikowsky and I wrote about protecting physicians from retaliation may be found at the end of this section.
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POSTED on the HealthLeadersMediaBlog by Bart Lee, February 5, 2009.
Why "disruptive physician" needs a better definition.
"Disruptive physician" all too often means: "You're outta here!" Now the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) has declared a "Sentinel Event Alert." JCAHO sometimes seems like a wholly owned subsidiary of Tenet and HCA, but giving it the benefit of the doubt, it has nonetheless advanced a view counter to the interests of physicians. A sentinel event used to be an inappropriately dead patient. Now in the name of, and abuse of the idea of, "patient safety," it seems to mean a physician that a hospital wants get rid of.
This implicit "Code of Silence," as it is enforced by the threat of the label of "disruptive," compromises patient safety. JCAHO mandates two new performance elements, EP-4 & 5. One looks to a code of conduct, which is fair enough. But the second looks to an in-house process for managing behaviors involving "disruption."
The trouble is, nobody's starting from Square One here.
Labeling a doctor disruptive is an established "management" technique fostered by health care industry lawyers. It is designed to pre-ordain the result of the then- inevitable peer review discipline proceedings that will expel the physician. It is the trigger for the initial, unilateral and summary suspension of a physician, which then gets reported nationwide in the National Practitioner Data Bank. It is the end of any career in medicine.
This technique as counseled and practiced is all too often a matter of hospital management by a kind of medical politics of destruction. Like the Wall Street Masters of the Universe, hospital administrators get credit for short-term performance, but are not held accountable for longer term failures, such as running good doctors out of practice. For an administrator the rule is simple, My Way or the Highway. Yet there is no policing of the administrators (unless the FBI steps in, as at Tenet Redding).
Only recently has Medicare declined to pay for at least some "never events" that any decent hospital administration would avoid - and most such events have little to do with physicians. Retaliation against a physician advocating for better patient care should be a never-event. JCAHO would be well advised to look at this side of the disruption issue.
My law office has represented both Dr. Nizar Yaqub and Dr. Gil Mileikowsky, whose unhappy predicaments are reported in the California appellate cases. See: Yaqub v. Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System (2004) 122 Cal. App.4th 474, 18 Cal. Rptr.3d 780; Mileikowsky v. West Hills Hosp. Medical Center (2007) 154 Cal. App.4th 752, 64 Cal. Rptr.3d 888, [affirmed -- Cal. 4th --, (2009)]. Dr. Mileikowsky and I have written an article on ways to counter retaliation: How to Protect Physician Whistleblower - Patient Advocates - from Retaliation to Benefit Patients - a legal analysis regarding Summary Suspension, Retaliation, Peer Review and Remedies, by Dr. Gil Mileikowsky, MD and Bartholomew Lee, Attorney at Law. http://www.allianceforpatientsafety.org/ articles.php
(Responding to Health Leaders Media blog http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/ view_comments.cfm?content_id=224418&topic=WS_HLM2_P HY -- one of 11 comments on "'Disruptive Physician' Needs a Better Definition" ##
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[Drafted by Bart Lee] Resolution 501-08 TITLE: DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ORIGINATING FROM B&P SECTION 805 REPORTS
WHEREAS, some health care entities appear to make it a practice to summarily suspend physicians clinical privileges from their hospital, irrespective of any risk to patients, before any hearing, adjudication or due process of law; and
WHEREAS, any such summary suspension and any related inappropriate public filing disrupts the patient-physician relationship, thereby putting at risk both patient welfare and continuity of care; and
WHEREAS, physicians can suffer professional defamation and public humiliation from false, manipulative, incorrect, misleading or stale administrative and public filings by health care entities, followed by adverse consequences, including destruction of their medical careers; and
WHEREAS, hospitals must report any summary suspension of a physician of more than 14 days duration to the Medical Board of California, as mandated by California Business and Professions Code section 805; and
WHEREAS, hospitals and some health care entities must report any summary suspension of a physician of more than 30 days duration to the National Practitioner Data Bank, as mandated by federal law; and
WHEREAS, adverse professional consequences including loss of all privileges at other hospitals and health care entities, loss of the physician's relationships with insurance carriers, such as contracts as a provider of medical services, and loss of professional liability insurance coverage can result from an adverse 805 Report of a summary suspension, irrespective of its validity; and
WHEREAS, the Medical Board of California automatically circulates, immediately, notice of a summary suspension without any verification, and later posts such information on its website, even if the Board’s own investigation finds no wrongdoing by the physician, and the Board refuses to remove any such report in almost all cases; therefore be it
RESOLVED: That CMA support legislation and seek an author to amend California Business and Professions Code section 2027, and add or amend other appropriate state laws that regulate the circulation of information by the Medical Board of California (MBC), such as Business and Professions Code 800 et seq.: (1) to preclude circulation and posting of any 805 Report of a summary suspension until confirmation by an MBC's independent investigation that such an 805 Report is supported by at least substantial evidence of risk to patients warranting a summary suspension, irrespective of any determination by the governing board of the responsible health care entity; (2) to require removal of any such 805 Report in the event any court reverses any adverse disciplinary action by any health care entity, or to require removal of any such 805 Report in the event MBC’s independent investigation exonerates the physician from the alleged charges; (3) to require MBC to afford any physician subject to any 805 Report, including an 805 Report due to a summary suspension or any other disciplinary action, the right to contest and respond to the charges in a writing of reasonable length, and to have that response posted in the same place in the records and postings of the MBC as the 805 Report or other disciplinary action contested; and be it further
RESOLVED: That the California Delegation to the AMA submit a similar resolution to amend the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, codified in Title 42 of the United States Code, and any other applicable federal law regulating the circulation or posting of reports by the National Practitioner Data Bank.
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POSTED on The MedLawBlog, by Bart Lee on July 19, 2007
I suspect that until hospitals face liability to actions by the private bar for bad faith peer review, it will continue. The key to opening the process to fairness is diminution of HCQIA's immunity. I have suggested a straightforward sword to cut this Gordian Knot:
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. 11112(b)(3) provides the loophole [retaliating] hospitals and their lawyers work their way through:
"A professional review body's failure to meet the [peer review] conditions described in this subsection shall not, in itself, constitute failure to meet the standards of subsection (a)(3) of this section." [providing wide immunity] "
The way to fix the problem this causes is to amend this section: "A professional review body's failure to meet the conditions described in this subsection shall, in itself, constitute failure to meet the standards of ubsection (a)(3) of this section."
That is, take out the "not."
A hospital that that runs a kangaroo court should not get to take advantage of its own wrongdoing. Each and every National Practitioner Data Bank report that results from a peer review body that fails to meet the specified conditions should not be privileged, should be enjoin-able in equity in state or federal court, and should give rise to a damages action including attorneys' fees. Each and every kangaroo court "peer review" should not enjoy immunity from any damages causes of action.
All of this may well drive some physicians out of the business of judging other physicians, as do many other factors. The hospitals have pretty much taken that over anyway, once the process gets out of departmental whitewashes and into "discipline." If it's going to be a legal rather than a medical process, it must be fair, afford due process of law and implement adequate legal remedies for those who are injured by wrongdoing, including attorneys' fees for intentionally or negligently injured or wronged physicians. I am looking forward to hearing related and indeed opposing views.
(Responding to: http://www.medlawblog.com/archives/ credentialing-ms120-a-chance-to-establish-neutral-peer-re view.html Home > Credentialing > MS.1.20 : A Chance to Establish Neutral Peer Review > Tuesday, July 17, 2007 | Posted By Michael Cassidy):
A Chance to Establish Neutral Peer Review Although the newly adopted Joint Commission Standard MS.1.20 will compel hospitals and medical staffs to re-evaluate the provisions of the medical staff by-laws on a multitude of issues, I would like to focus just upon peer review issues from the physician's perspective, i.e., the physician who is the "target" of the peer review investigation or process. While some stakeholders in this process from all perspectives, i.e., hospitals, physicians, administrators, medical staff officers, reject the notion that sham peer review is a problem, there is nevertheless almost universal acknowledgment that the peer review process is a threatening process to physicians being investigated. *** [##]
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POSTED on The Health Care Blog by Bart Lee (2008):
Presently "Peer Review" as discipline is all too often biased. These biases go largely uncorrected because of the immunity provisions of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, which has not improved the quality of health care.
There is a sword available, by a simple amendment, to untie this Gordian Knot: My suggestion, which follows, as to the best and quickest way to fix HCQIA's immunity problem, is
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b)(3) provides the loophole [retaliating] hospitals and their lawyers work their way through: "A professional review body's failure to meet the [peer review] conditions described in this subsection shall not, in itself, constitute failure to meet the standards of subsection (a)(3) of this section." [providing wide immunity]
The way to fix the problem this causes is to amend this section:
"A professional review body's failure to meet the conditions described in this subsection shall, in itself, constitute failure to meet the standards of subsection (a)(3) of this section."
That is, take out the "not."
***
Dr. Mileikowsky's difficulties started in the year 2000. The present appeal victory involved HCA. Tenet and HCA sometimes joint-venture. Dr. Mileikowsky's SBA testimony before the Small Business Administration 14 June 2007 is available at: http://www.allianceforpatientsafety.org/ sba.pdf
Appendix to testimony (includes Horty-Springer materials):
http://www.allianceforpatientsafety.org/ sba-appendix.php ***
http://www.thehealthcareblog.com/ the_health_care_blog/2007/06/
physicians-deat.html#comment-7 4202676
John Irvine's note is most welcome. We represented Dr. Mileikowsky; Charly Kagay of this office handled the appeal. See http://www.allianceforpatientsafety.org/ westhills/wh-06-08-2007.pdf. Dr. Mileikowsky's Black Box idea is a system of anonymous and objective review. See http://www.allianceforpatientsafety.org/ blackbox.pdf
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There follows an abbreviated text of How To Protect Physician Whistleblower Patient Advocates from Retaliation, to Benefit Patients - a legal analysis regarding Summary Suspension, Retaliation, Peer Review and Remedies, by Bartholomew Lee (blee@slksf.com) and Dr. Gil Mileikowsky. (See the "Reported Cases, Publications..." page of this website for a link to the full article with all citations). Correspondence is invited by Bartholomew Lee at blee@slksf.com -- member of the California Bar, of counsel to Spiegel Liao & Kagay, San Francisco, California. Dr. Mileikowsky is a client of the firm. The views expressed herein are ours and not those of the firm, its partners or its counsel. We are grateful to Dr. Nick Yaqub, (MD, JD) also a client of the firm, for valuable insight and analysis but the views expressed herein are not necessarily his either. See: Yaqub v. Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System (2004) 122 Cal. App.4th 474, 18 Cal. Rptr.3d 780; Mileikowsky v. West Hills Hosp. Medical Center (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 752, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 888, [affirmed 2009 -- Cal. 4th --].
Introduction
The Overriding Public Interest in Saving lives: More than half a million people
have died in a recent three year period as a result of medical error and
complications in the United States. The World Health Organization (WHO) and
others say that American health care ranks low among the nations third-world
care at twice the cost, in effect. The RAND Corporation finds: "all adults
...are at risk for receiving poor health care, no matter where they live; why,
where and from whom they seek care; or what their race, gender or financial
status is."
It
is, however, unlikely that the situation will improve by itself. Physicians who
try to diminish patient risk and improve patient care and safety are often
targeted for retaliation. The integrity of the House of Medicine is thus at
risk, as is health care itself. The following proposals to counter, limit and
deter retaliation will decrease overall costs. It is a paradox of modern
American medicine that patients don't get what is paid for, quality care. The
Health Care Quality Improvement Act and substituted state legislation has
failed to protect patients and prejudices their safety.
The
Problem: Patient Safety Advocacy Risks Immediate Professional Destruction: "A lie can travel
halfway round the world while the truth is putting on its shoes," said Mark Twain. Physicians
who speak out can suffer the irreversible defamation of a public report of
accusation alone, in the context of hospital discipline of physicians. These
physicians may or may not have done anything wrong, and may well have simply
done too many things right for the comfort of some. Protecting physician
patient-safety advocates from retaliatory discipline is essential to improve
the quality of delivery of care. Physicians who advocate for patients' safety
must be protected from institutional retaliation, for the sake of the patients
as well as the physicians.
As
Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz stated: "Physicians who are entrusted
with the care of their patients can see their professional careers destroyed if
they dare to challenge a hospital's practices. When a 'whistleblowing'
physician is retaliated against, it threatens not only the physician's
livelihood, but the care of all patients. This ... affects every patient and
potential patient in America."
The
chilling effect on physicians resurrects the old Code of Silence that formerly
frustrated so many meritorious medical malpractice cases.
Unfortunately
for patients, the old proverb "the way to Hell is paved with good
intentions" applies. This is so because the presumably good intentions
behind laws regulating medical practice have been defeated by conflicting
economic interests. According to extensive research by Harvard's Professor
Lucian Leape, it is not in any hospital's best economic interest to reduce
errors and complications He notes that there are no warrantees in medical care
and he reports " perversely, under most forms of payment, healthcare
professionals receive a premium for defective products, physicians and
hospitals can bill for the additional services that are needed when patients
are injured by their mistakes." Inasmuch as hospitals profit from
high-cost, high-complication bad medicine they have every incentive to
encourage it, making more than enough money to pay premiums for malpractice
insurance, at most a nuisance.
Persistent
bad medicine is encouraged all the more by retaliation against those who oppose
it, especially because effective good faith peer review that reduces errors and
complications would diminish hospital revenues. In the present environment,
dollar signs trump patients' vital signs. "Retaliation" is wrongful
in many ways, on many levels and on various legal grounds, including its
violation of Equal Protection of the Laws and of Due Process of Law.
As
one model of public protection by way of proscription of retaliation, the
California Business and Professionals Code protects physicians against
retaliation with respect to insurance companies, and medical groups. This does
not yet apply to hospitals that suspend or revoke privileges of physicians who
are not employees. It is both ironic and unjust that the members of the learned
professions of medicine, who enjoy mere "privileges" at hospitals,
have less protection as patient advocates than any employee including orderlies
and night custodial staff, as valuable and necessary as their labors may
be.
A
summary suspension of a physician from practice in a hospital is just that:
summary, without any process at all in which the physician can participate. A
registered report of a summary suspension of a physician ends that physician's
career. The physician is condemned before any hearing is even initiated. This
is professional capital punishment before trial. Once a hospital reports a
physician's summary suspension to a state medical board or agency, it creates
an avalanche effect by mandatory reporting to the National Practitioners Data
Bank, (NPDB). Other hospitals will then deny that physician's clinical
privileges as well, followed by suspension of medical liability insurance
coverage and preclusion of participation with medical insurance
providers.
Moreover,
there is no penalty for a false report and no private judicial redress
available, unlike for example a private libel. Making the problem worse, there
is no administrative remedy for a state Medical Board's continuing to post an
accusation which that Board has itself found to be unfounded. The goal to be
achieved, immediately lest it become meaningless, is "name-clearing"
of the physician advocate, besmirched and tainted by suspension or worse. This
is a matter of substantive and not procedural due process of law.
Unless
a physician can prevent the professional libel of a public report of the summary
suspension, other remedies for retaliation are for all practical purposes moot,
too late and ineffective. "Substantive" due process in economic
matters is much disfavored since about 1905. On the other hand, protection of
many constitutional rights other than property rights amounts to substantive
due process in disguise. The notion of a substantive right to protect one's
good name is implemented by the procedure of a "name-clearing
hearing."
It
is well established in a leading California case that a professional has a
liberty interest in his professional reputation (name) that is distinct and
separate from property interest in his medical license. The California Supreme
Court ruled with respect to the California Constitution: "It is clear that
the due process clause of article I, section 7(a) is self-executing, and that
even without any effectuating legislation, all branches of government are
required to comply with its terms. Furthermore, it also is clear that, like
many other constitutional provisions, this section supports an action, brought
by a private plaintiff against a proper defendant, for declaratory relief or
for injunction.... "
One's
good name is a liberty interest and substantive interest, and the law protects
liberty interests more than property interests. In this case, a professor of
medicine at a University of California medical school and Chair of its
Department of Radiology was investigated for alleged misappropriation of funds.
At the conclusion of investigation the University announced that it initiated
"appropriate personnel actions," but did not name any specific
employee. The professor was then removed as the Chair, but remained tenured at
the medical school and a staff physician at its medical center. The California Supreme
Court held that "[a]lthough the department chairmanship was an at-will
position, terminable without cause at the discretion of the chancellor of the
... campus (and hence plaintiff concedes that he had no due process property
right to that position), it is well established that an at-will [public]
employee's liberty interests are deprived when his discharge is accompanied by
charges that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his
community or impose[ ] on him a stigma or other disability that foreclose[s]
his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities."
To
establish the right to a name-clearing hearing a petitioner " ... must
first establish that the due process clause applies by showing a protected
liberty or property interest." A liberty interest is shown if "the
accuracy of the charge is contested, there is some public disclosure of the
charge, and it is made in connection with the [petitioner]." Thus the
liberty interest a physician has in his or her good name justifies an immediate
opportunity for at least a temporary restraining order, followed by injunctive
relief, against at least registration or publication of a summary or otherwise
unadjudicated suspension.
The
Law Today Favors Bad Medicine: Once a hospital hearing to test a summary suspension
commences, the administrative process controls the suspended physician. Due to
the "doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies" no court will
intervene to prevent administrative dissemination of the defamation of the
report of the summary suspension, even though there has been no adverse finding
or adjudication. "Exhaustion of administrative remedies" usually
means exhaustion of physician resources, in litigation and its antecedents,
especially inasmuch as the physician cannot (on interim suspension) practice
medicine.
Furthermore,
due to the abuse by hospitals of that doctrine, hospitals can prolong that
administrative process with many delays, e.g., by an ostensibly favorable
ruling of the hospital's appeal board granting yet another, new
"hearing" to the still suspended physician. That is a most effective
strategy, at worst malicious prosecution, at best "good intentions gone
awry," to exhaust the physician as an adversary emotionally, financially
and physically. Hence, the hospital wins by attrition before any litigation is
even possible. In the end, the physician's "exhaustion of administrative
remedies" may be futile. It all too often ends up with a final blow by the
governing board of the hospital (even if members of that board may believe that
this physician is innocent). This is so, because a ruling by the governing
board in favor of the physician, would open the door to claims for monetary
damages for the physician against the hospital. The board in its perceived fiduciary
responsibility will wish to prevent such a financial loss.
The
hospital simply must bury its mistake, and take advantage of the reluctance of
judges to substitute judgment for medical professionals in staff matters.
Moreover,
a physician who can get to court generally at most wins a remand to the
administering hospital, for yet another round of hearings.
When
it is understood that hospitals' attorneys drafted the amended federal Health
Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA 1989), the insertion of a quasi-judicial
immunity provision can also be explained. The effect if not the object was not
so much protection of physician participants in good faith peer review; rather
it was the perhaps unintended consequence of protection of hospitals that
sponsor bad faith peer review. Hence, only very few injured physicians in the
last 20 years have been able to get past the twin peaks of judicial deference
to medical prosecutors and administrators and immunity for the complicit as
well as the innocent.
As
if this were not enough, the HCQIA also provides that a peer review body's
failure to meet the conditions described in the law does not constitute failure
to meet the applicable standards. In other words, failure to comply with this
particular law is not a violation of this particular law. Such a caveat
sacrifices the health care quality improvement spirit of the law by gutting the
letter of the law. In effect, the hospitals' lawyers' lobbying has loaded the
dice. The public cannot expect this process to be either fair or reasonable. An
objective observer could join advocates in concluding that at this time, the
"peer review" disciplinary hearing process is rigged to a point way
beyond any "stacked deck" of cards. Even without malicious intent,
physicians from the same hospital are frequently too close to the personalities
to avoid bias one way or the other (unlike, for example, a jury of one's peers
in court, who are strangers to the parties). Hospital administrators face
economic incentives to maximize income, but not to minimize
complications.
Ironically,
bad physicians are rarely subject to such malicious prosecution. This is so
because they are often significant income providers to the hospital and thus
enjoy the protection of a hospital more concerned with revenues than patient
well-being. This was the case in Redding, California for two heart doctors who
did hundreds of sometimes fatal heart procedures, utterly unneeded, and full of
risk. All monitoring and inspection by several agencies failed to detect this enormity.
When hospital managements, closest to the problems, are compensated only in
proportion to revenue growth, patient safety suffers. Often bad physicians,
without the leverage of big revenue, simply agree to leave the hospital,
provided the hospital does not report them to the state medical board, thereby
minimizing its own exposures. They thus evade the "radar screen" of
mandatory reporting.
The
public is not protected. The reporting system tells of summary suspensions of
even outstanding physicians without adjudications, but cannot report
cover-ups.
Thus,
the goals of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act are undercut by hospitals'
economic conflicts of interest. Even motivated patients cannot get undistorted
information about physicians. Policy-makers, law-makers, courts, legislative
staffs, federal and state agencies, employers, unions, and experts responsible
for drafting public healthcare law appear not to grasp Professor Leape's point.
The healthcare costs explosion will continue to erode the quality of delivery
of medical care in America as long as bad medicine is lucrative.
It
is thus all the more important, as a counter-force, to provide effective
protection for all physicians and healthcare providers who show that they care
about patient safety by standing up for it. Advocacy for patient safety is to
be encouraged, not punished. These health care professionals are
"whistleblowers," a legal term that well describes them as the people
who call attention to wrongdoing. They are to be protected from the often
inevitable retaliation against them. That retaliation, usually beginning with a
summary suspension, destroys them professionally and compromises patient care
deeply. Such protection is in the best interest of patients, the economy, and ultimately
it is to the benefit of the many excellent physicians and the "House of
Medicine" itself.
Remedies
Proposed: Although
private redress can provide deterrents to retaliation, as discussed below, it
is often too little, too late. An immediate resort to the judicial process of
the ex-parte temporary restraining order to review a summary suspension would
be more effective, followed by substantive litigation if need be. One model
appears from administrative practice: in California, its Medical Board may summarily
suspend a physician from all medical practice. The device is an Interim Order
of Suspension (IOS). Such an order may, however, be challenged immediately in
court, and a stay obtained. Inasmuch as a summary suspension by a hospital
quickly results in equivalently draconian effects on a physician's practice, an
equivalently swift and sure remedy is only fair.
An
amendment to HCQIA or California's governing statute could provide for such an
immediate resort to court upon summary suspension, without res judicata effect
either way. Thus, statute could and should provide for a way for a summarily
suspended physician to obtain the judicial redress of an immediate stay of the
suspension, or at least any report to the medical board of it, and a stay of the
medical board making any report of the suspension until after a final and
adverse adjudication. This is the necessary procedural vehicle to prevent
effective retaliation. The courts may be relied upon to deny such immediate
relief to any physician who, by reason of impairment or otherwise, does present
any danger to the public. The career-ending report of a summary suspension
should not be the unreviewable decision of an adversary hospital, but rather
follow only a neutral adjudication.
Further
Proposed Statutory Amendments To Deter Hospital Retaliation: Two initial ways to protect
physicians whistleblowers could harness existing means of redress, to
facilitate immediate judicial relief as well as ultimate remedy. One is to deny
wrongdoers a shield under Health Care Quality Improvement Act HCQIA. The second
is to provide physician advocates a sword under the Civil Rights Act
(1872).
1) The shield is removed by two
amendments to the HCQIA: First: "Retaliation against a physician or other
health-care provider for advocacy for health care quality improvement,
including testimony, is not immune, under this Act or any state law, to private
judicial redress by way of damages and injunctive relief, and attorneys'
fees." Immunity is the doctrine that precludes private redress
irrespective of wrongdoing; judges for example, enjoy civil immunity, although
they can be prosecuted criminally, impeached, or disciplined. Physicians on
peer review disciplinary panels enjoy civil immunity under the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA). Secondly, inasmuch as defective peer review is
the cause of so much harm and error, rethinking the immunity that derives from
the mere presence of some peer review process is appropriate. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C.
11112(b)(3) provides the loophole that a retaliation-minded hospital can work a
way through: "A professional review body's failure to meet the [peer
review] conditions described in this subsection shall not, in itself,
constitute failure to meet the standards of subsection (a)(3) of this section."
Meeting those standards provides the wide immunity of HCQIA. The way to fix the
problem this section causes is to amend this section thus: "A professional
review body's failure to meet the conditions described in this subsection shall,
in itself, constitute failure to meet the standards of subsection (a)(3) of
this section." That is, take out the "not."
A
hospital tempted to run a kangaroo court should not get to take advantage of
its own wrongdoing. Each and every National Practitioner Data Bank report that
results from a peer review body that fails to meet the specified conditions
should not be privileged, should be enjoin-able in equity in state or federal
court, and should give rise to a damages action including attorneys' fees. A
kangaroo court "peer review" should not enjoy immunity from any
damages causes of action including antitrust treble damages upon a showing of
violation and impact.
All
of this may well drive some physicians out of the business of judging other
physicians, as do many other factors. The hospitals have pretty much taken that
over anyway, once the process gets out of departmental whitewashes and into
"discipline." If it is going to be a legal rather than a medical
process, it must be fair, afford due process of law and implement adequate
legal remedies for those who are injured by wrongdoing, including attorneys'
fees for intentionally or negligently injured or wronged physicians.
2) The sword is provided by an
amendment to the Civil Rights Act, 1983: "Retaliation, against a physician
or other health-care provider for advocacy, including testimony, for health
care quality improvement or patient safety, by or in any institution that is
governed by HCQIA or related state law, or funded directly or indirectly by the
United States, is a denial of due process of law and equal protection of the
laws, for which private judicial redress by way of monetary damages for all
injury, and injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees, shall be available under
this Act, notwithstanding any post-deprivation administrative remedy or any
requirement of exhaustion of remedies." This amendment provides judicial
redress for deprivation of the substantive right to speak out, testify and act
in the pubic interest free of retaliation. This is the Right to Petition for
Redress of Grievances guaranteed by the First Amendment.
3) In California, amendment to
the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code 51, can also provide a sword:
"Retaliation by any person, organization, healthcare institution or the
like, that is governed California law such as the Business and Professions
Code, the Health and Safety Code, and the like, or funded in whole or in part,
directly or indirectly, by the State of California or any of its subdivisions,
districts or the like, against a physician-advocate or any other health care
professional for advocacy, including testimony, for health care quality
improvement or patient safety, is a denial of equality before the law and due
process of law, as they are guaranteed by the Constitution of this state, for
which private judicial redress by way of monetary damages for all injury, and
injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees, shall be available under this Act,
notwithstanding any post-deprivation administrative remedy or any requirement
of exhaustion of remedies and without application of any provision of law
respecting strategic litigation against public participation." This
amendment also provides judicial redress, under California law, for deprivation
of the substantive right to speak out, testify and act in the pubic interest
free of retaliation.
4) Another avenue may effect
better health care by means of deterrence. Enforcement of the criminal law has
as one of its primary purposes deterrence, but it fails for it apparent near-
random impact, compromised by implicit political considerations, delay, and
leniency for the white-collared. Private enforcement, on the other hand, is
distributed widely, not centralized, promoted by private incentives such as
treble damages, and highly effective. An example is the treble damage action of
the Clayton Antitrust Act for violations of the earlier Sherman Antitrust
Act. Inasmuch as so much of the revenue of the hospital industry comes
from the federal government ( e.g., Medicare, Medicaid), systemic improvements
in such federally funded care will also benefit all others receiving care from
the industry. An amendment to the False Claims Act could provide private
incentives to litigation for large amounts of money. This in turn could effect
the deterrence needed to protect physician-advocates (and others) from
retaliation. Such an amendment could provide: "Violations of statutory or
regulatory conditions of participation in federally funded programs, by a
recipient of direct or indirect federal funding, coupled with certification of
compliance therewith, shall be fraud on the United States notwithstanding
apparent compliance with any other regulation, or accreditation." Use of
the False Claims Act with respect to Medicare Conditions of Participation (COP)
requiring good faith, as opposed to retaliatory, "peer review" may
provide some deterrence to bad faith peer review, almost always retaliatory, or
anti-competitive.
It
may be noted that Medicare affects only people over 65 years of age. In
practical terms, the effect of enforcement of law such that institutions must
enable only good faith peer review because of Medicare constraints, protects
all by protecting the favored. In other words, what the economists call
"positive externalities" make for equitable results assuming
effective enforcement of Medicare Conditions of Participation.
Denial
of good faith peer review to the treatment of younger patients, at least as
effective as that as required by law for treatment of older patients, is a
denial of equal protection of the laws. To obviate this inequality, acceptance
of any federal funding for any aspect of hospital care should by legislation be
subject to explicit acceptance of Medicare-equivalent COP with respect to peer
review. Violation of such extended COP should be subject to FCA enforcement.
Patients are best equally protected by physician peer review only when the
incentives to do it right are equal for younger and older patients. Moreover,
all hospital care as affected by peer review is protected and promoted by
"official proceedings." These proceedings cannot equitably be
different for patients simply by reason of the patients' age. Any such
invidious difference should be actionable under the Civil Rights Act.
Questions
of standing-to-sue may arise, but FCA claims for relief could be accompanied by
Civil Rights Act Equal Protection claims for relief as well.
For
the False Claims Act to provide deterrence, the private complainants,
denominated "relators," need the encouragement of the monetary
reward. Now, only the "original source" of the information about the
false claim proven qualifies to participate in the recovery. An amendment is
appropriate to enable all sources of the non-public information leading to the
prosecution to share in the reward.
A
related disincentive to the consequences of bad faith peer review could be
civil forfeiture of the "ill-gotten gains" from the revenues
generated in the absence of effective peer review that minimizes complications.
The Tenet Redding, California hospital case cries out for such a remedy.
Forfeiture could reach the parent corporations and the company executives who
personally prosper from failing to prevent predatory and malicious
medicine.
5) Another way to protect such
physicians is to interpose a neutral evaluator unconnected to the hospital
industry to process possibly retaliatory claims against physicians to determine
merit. This would require creation by statute of a dedicated adjudicatory
mechanism, not unlike the administrative courts system in the federal and many
state governments. Awaiting such a development, an existing system for air
industry safety could be adopted: The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) operates two anonymous safety-advocate reporting systems,
one in healthcare for the Veterans Administration, which could be adapted to
physician-advocate reports of inadequate health care practices and instances.
By this means, the physician-advocate avoids retaliation by means of officially
sponsored anonymity.
Conclusion: Public Safety Merits new Statutory Protections for Whistleblowers: The health of the public is at stake here. Physicians are closest to their patients and best able to advocate for better health care for them. Present healthcare industry structure and unintended consequences of regulatory legislation lend themselves to punitive legal proceedings against whistleblower patient safety advocates. A modest set of statutory amendments, prophylactic and remedial, especially to prevent premature reporting of summary suspensions, can counteract these inequities and rebalance the House of Medicine so it may Do No Harm. ##f experience. Cases that he's tried and won are easily found on the Internet. I had the good fortune to work with him in a case where we represented a person against a large, multinational corporation. I learned a great deal working with him.”
